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The global financial crisis prompted a period of widespread regulatory changes geared 
towards creating a safer financial system. The Basel III regulation emerged post-crisis and 
adjusted the minimum capital requirements for banks, attempting to ensure that they would 
be better equipped to absorb losses in the case of the next potential crisis. Advocates of this 
regulation believe that our financial system is far safer when these higher capital 
requirements are in place, and some advocates believe these requirements should be even 
higher. On the other hand, critics of this regulation argue that as a result of these 
requirements, banks profit less and their lending behaviors are impacted negatively. The 
research question of this thesis was formed as a response to these critics and asks: What 
effect do the Basel III capital requirements have on bank profitability and lending behavior. 
This thesis uses a regression analysis to determine whether these capital requirements have 
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“Starting with the banking system, the good news is that it is better capitalized. The 
quantity and quality of capital required relative to risk-weighted assets have been 
increased substantially and capital requirements are higher for the largest, most systemic 
firms. This lowers the risk of distress at such firms and encourages them to limit activities 
that could threaten financial stability.” — Janet Yellen, Chair of the Federal Reserve 
from 2014-2018 (Yellen, 2018) 
 
“One of the lessons of the 2008-09 experience…was the fact that every company in the 
United States was a domino, and those dominoes were placed right next to each 
other…so when they started toppling, everything was in line.” —Warren Buffett, CEO of 
Berkshire Hathaway (Friedman, 2018) 
 
Ten years after the financial crisis, the economy seems to be booming and the 
banking sector appears to have recovered. The period of time that followed the 2007-
2009 financial crisis was defined by large changes in the regulatory environment of the 
financial services sector. The laissez-faire economic policy that reigned in the 1970’s and 
80’s proved ineffective, and regulators stepped in to promote economic stability and 
improve the safety of the banking sector. Two of the regulations that emerged from this 
post-crisis period were the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(also known as “Dodd-Frank”) and Basel III, which is the third installment of the Basel 
Accords. These two pieces of regulation were created in order to improve the stability of 
the financial sector and to prevent future crises.  
The focus of this paper will be on Basel III, which addresses the issue of bank 
capital structure from a regulatory standpoint after the financial crisis of 2008. The goal 
of the legislation is, put simply, to safeguard banks that are “too big to fail” by regulating 
their capital requirements. This paper will assess whether the capital requirements given 
in this regulation are promoting stability at the cost of profitability and lending 
capabilities. The literature review will provide a historical account of the financial crisis, 
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give an overview of the regulatory response to the crisis, and will delve into the literature 
surrounding the Basel III regulation. In the research methodology section of this paper, I 
will explain my methods, define my sample, justify the reasoning behind the metrics I 
chose, and highlight the limitations of my research. Finally, in my research analysis and 
discussion sections, I will discuss the findings of my research and conclude that Basel III 
has had no effect on bank profitability and little effect on bank lending behaviors, except 
in the case of select banks. I will conclude this paper by suggesting to other scholars in 
this field how my findings could be built upon or improved upon in future research. 
 
Research Question 
           Scholars and regulators agree that capital requirements in the financial system 
have successfully increased the stability of our largest banks at both the individual level 
and the systemic level. However, a debate persists on whether this stability has come at a 
cost. The research questions I am determined to address is: Have the Basel III capital 
requirements, aimed at improving the stability of the financial system, negatively 
impacted the profitability and lending behaviors of global systemically important banks 
in the United States? I will divide this question into two parts by analyzing first the 
effect, if any, these capital requirements have had on bank profitability, and secondly, the 
effect, if any, these capital requirements have had on the lending capabilities of banks. 
Through my research, I hope to determine the extent to which this regulation may have 
impacted the profitability and lending behaviors of global systemically important banks 
in the United States. Based on my findings, I will also provide recommendations for 
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potential future regulations that attempt to promote stability in the financial sector. 
Finally, I hope to reach a conclusion that future scholars can build upon in their research.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
           In my literature review, I will give a brief overview of the financial crisis of 2007 
and 2008, focusing on the role that highly leveraged banks played in the collapse. Next, I 
will discuss the regulatory response to the crisis, focusing on the Basel III Accord, while 
also briefly differentiating between the Dodd-Frank Act as well as Basel I and Basel II. In 
addition, I will give a high-level overview of the Basel III capital requirements and 
provide a review of the current literature relating to the Basel III capital requirements, 
including material from scholars both in favor of stricter capital requirements as well as 
those who argue the capital requirements are too stringent already. Since this field is 
relatively saturated in terms of research, I tried to focus on several key studies or papers 
that I found valuable and most closely related to this topic. The debate surrounding the 
Basel III capital structure regulation will serve as a segue into my research methodology, 
in which I will discuss the selection of my sample data, my research design, and the 
metrics I will use to analyze bank profitability and lending behaviors.  
 
Introduction to the Financial Crisis 
The occurrence of financial crises can be explained a variety of ways by different 
scholars. The modern economy is thought to operate through cycles of “booms” and 
“busts,” where the most severe busts take the form of financial crises. Hyman Minsky, an 
Austrian economist, argued in 1977 that the finance industry is plagued by “systemic 
fragility,” meaning “that the development of a fragile financial structure results from the 
normal functioning of our economy; financial fragility and thus the susceptibility of our 
economy to disruption is not due to either accidents or policy errors” (Minsky, 1977). 
 5 
While Minsky believed that financial crises are an inherent part of our economy, other 
economists believe that crises are spurred on by the mistakes of the actors in the 
economic system, such as banks or governments. Two prevailing schools of thought in 
modern economics are Keynesian economics, named for the work of macroeconomist 
John Maynard Keynes, and neoclassical economics. The Keynesian approach 
“emphasizes that capitalist market economies have a built-in tendency to instability” 
(Hansen, 2014). Alternatively, the neo-classical approach asserts “that the market creates 
equilibrium by itself unless distorted by harmful state or bank intervention” (Hansen, 
2014). Recognizing the discrepancies in beliefs pertaining to why financial crises happen 
is important because these scholars also disagree on how to fix such crises. 
In the case of the 2008 global financial crisis, subprime mortgage bonds held by 
large financial institutions failed as a result of the housing bubble. As borrowers were no 
longer able to pay back their mortgages, the mortgage bonds held by the banks rapidly 
declined in value. When Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in September of 2008, 
President George W. Bush assured tax payers that there would not be a bailout. At the 
time, the general public had such confidence in the market that they assumed no bank 
was “too big to fail.” In his book, The Shifts and the Shocks: What We’ve Learned—And 
Have Still to Learn—From the Financial Crisis, Martin Wolf, the chief economics 
commentator at the Financial Times, cites financial liberalization as a reason for fragility 
within the finance sector (Wolf, 2014). Wolf states that this liberalization could be traced 
back to the 1980’s, citing the politics of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, a decline 
of confidence in Keynesianism, and a growth in the belief of the free market (Wolf, 
2014). During this time, Wolf states that there occurred a “shift towards trust in markets 
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over governments… [stating that] the rise of the liberal financial markets was inevitable” 
(Wolf, 2014). Wolf reasons that this liberalization arose since “the passage of time and 
the experience of a long period of financial stability had robbed the Western world of the 
terror of financial instability born in the 1930s” (Wolf, 2014). As trust in the markets 
wavered and with the financial system teetering on a collapse, the government therefore 
pushed for a taxpayer bailout of the largest financial institutions. 
With the government acting as a “lender of last resort,” or LLR, many banks were 
able to recover quickly (Bordo, 2014). Historically, the LLR would intervene in order to 
prevent default for an illiquid, but solvent, bank. However, in the United States, the 
lender of last resort, a responsibility undertaken by the Federal Reserve, has moved far 
beyond the original LLR function (Bordo, 2014). In the early 1930’s the Federal Reserve 
failed to intervene and prevent several banking panics, which eventually led to the Great 
Depression. However, leading up to the crisis of 2008, a new culture had taken over in 
which financial institutions and the government maintained a closer relationship, in part 
due to the frequency of lobbying activities by financial institutions. Freddie Mac and 
Fannie May provide one of the best examples of financial institutions turned lobbyists 
(Wallison and Calomiris, 2008). In the mid-2000’s, these institutions lobbied to Congress 
for affordable housing, which allowed them to invest heavily in riskier mortgages 
between 2005 and 2007 (Wallison & Calomiris, 2008). As a result of these investments, 
Fannie May and Freddie Mac, which suffered over $1 trillion in losses during the 
financial crisis, were eventually taken over by the government (Wallison & Calomiris, 
2008).  
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Scholars have remained divided on whether or not the government should have 
played such an active role as the lender of last resort in facilitating the recovery of the US 
financial system after the 2008 crisis. Some scholars believe that when banks can count 
on a bailout, financial institutions will act irresponsibly due to moral hazard, which is the 
lack of incentive to guard against risk knowing that another party will absorb the cost of 
one’s actions (Bordo, 1990). The close relationship between the government and the 
financial sector has ensured that in the event of a crisis, banks can count on the 
government to bail them out. In a government bailout of large financial institutions, the 
public pays the cost for the transgressions of the banking system. On the other hand, 
without a bailout, the economy risks a bank run and a full-blown banking panic (Bordo, 
1990). However, the middle ground may be found by scholars like Michael Bordo, who 
posits that the actions of the lender of last resort need to be rules-based rather than 
discretionary, so as not to create further confusion in the markets during a time of 
financial crisis (Bordo, 2014). The financial crisis of 2008 and the fragility of many of 
the largest banks further bolstered this idea that more regulation would be needed in order 
to protect the economy and prevent future financial crises of this magnitude. As a result, 
two sweeping pieces of bank regulation emerged post-crisis: The Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act and Basel III. 
 
The Regulatory Response to the Crisis 
After the bailout, the 2008 financial crisis called for new financial regulations to 
improve the stability of a system that many thought was completely secure. This 
regulatory response included the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
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Protection Act, signed into effect by President Barack Obama on July 21, 2010, and 
Basel III, the third installment of the Basel Accord, which was fully implemented by 
January 1, 2019. Both of these regulations include adjustments made to the minimum 
capital requirements of financial institutions. Since many of these financial institutions 
were heavily leveraged, or financed by debt, the government had to provide a bailout in 
order that these institutions could remain solvent. Changing the capital structure of banks 
through these regulations would, in theory, substantially lower the responsibilities of the 
government as a lender of last resort. That is, if banks are financed by less debt, and in 
turn, have more common equity to act as a buffer for their losses, there is less need for a 
bailout from a LLR in the case of a financial crisis.  
The ultimate goal of these two regulations is to strengthen the financial system by 
mitigating risks and promoting stability. While many scholars believe that increasing the 
capital requirements for financial institutions will successfully satisfy that goal, there are 
also challengers who support the deregulation of the financial industry. One of the main 
differences between the two regulations is that Basel III has been adopted to different 
extents and according to different timelines in comparison to Dodd-Frank. In addition, 
the question of whether these minimum capital requirements are enough to eliminate the 
existence of a “too big to fail” financial institution still persists. Since the main regulatory 
changes in capital structure came through Basel III, this regulation will be the primary 
focus of this paper. I will attempt to address whether these US banks have suffered in 
terms of their profitability or their ability to lend as a result of the new capital 
requirements put forth by the Basel III regulation.      
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Basel I and Basel II 
           The Basel Accord is comprised of Basel I, Basel II, and Basel III. In 1988, the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), a committee within the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), published Basel I. Basel I, the first of the three 
installments within the Basel Accord, focused primarily on capital adequacy at a time 
when the Latin American debt crisis elevated concerns in regards to the capital ratios of 
international banks (“History of the Basel Committee,” 2014). According to Martin Wolf, 
Basel I’s main contribution to the regulatory environment was the risk-weighting of 
assets, organized into five different categories. Wolf writes that in Basel I, “Ironically, 
and dangerously, these weights treated government debt as riskless and put triple-A rated 
mortgage-backed securities into the next least risky category” (Wolf, 2014). For this 
reason, among others, the regulation had to be amended, which resulted in Basel II. The 
BCBS passed Basel II in 2004, expanding upon the minimum capital requirements 
proposed in Basel I and adjusting for technological advancements made within the 
banking sector (“History of the Basel Committee,” 2014). The 2008 financial crisis 
occurred during the period that banks were still implementing the changes made in Basel 
II. As a result, Basel III emerged as a response to the 2008 financial crisis. Wolf contends 
that Basel III “is very much the progeny of the two earlier accords. It still relies on risk-
weighting…even though that approach failed in the run-up to the crisis” (Wolf, 2014). 
Therefore, although the new amendments made in Basel III built upon and corrected the 
two earlier installments, certain aspects of this approach, such as the risk-weighting of 




While scholars continue to disagree on the causes of the financial crisis and the 
solutions that were adopted as a way of preventing future crises of this magnitude, a 
general consensus exists that if banks had more capital on reserve at the time of the crisis, 
the repercussions may not have been quite so severe. The 2008 financial crisis spurred 
various regulatory changes across the world, primarily the Dodd-Frank Act in the United 
States and Basel III in Europe. While Dodd-Frank was signed by President Barack 
Obama, Basel III was the product of the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision 
(established in 1974), and experienced a longer implementation period. The BCBS 
worked towards improving the stability of the financial system by establishing three 
pillars of focus in the law (Miu, Ozdemir & Giesinger, 2010). The first pillar of Basel III 
will be the main focus of this paper since it raises the minimum capital requirements for 
financial institutions.  
Pillar I of Basel III, which focuses on enhancing minimum capital and liquidity 
requirements, aims to reduce risk in the financial system. Through tax-benefits associated 
with debt financing, the government has historically subsidized debt for banks. The Basel 
III regulation states that “The build up of leverage also has been a feature of previous 
financial crises,” therefore acknowledging the role that highly leveraged financial 
institutions have played in financial crises (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2011). In addition, Basel III identifies a lack of quality capital as a contributor to the 
severity of the financial crisis. The regulation provides a new definition for capital, 
stating that “A key element of the new definition of capital is the greater focus on 
common equity, the highest quality component of a bank’s capital” (Basel III, 2010). 
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Basel III divides capital into two types: Tier 1 Capital and Tier 2 Capital. The definitions 
for these two types are as follows: 
• Tier 1 Capital: Tier 1 Capital can be further divided into two types of Tier 1 
Capital: Common Equity Tier 1 Capital (CET1) and Additional Tier 1 Capital. 
o Common Equity Tier 1 Capital: The Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) defines common equity tier 1 capital as follows: 
“includes qualifying common stock and related surplus net of treasury 
stock; retained earnings; certain accumulated other comprehensive income 
(AOCI) elements if the institution does not make an AOCI opt-out 
election (refer to opt-out election discussion in next paragraph), plus or 
minus regulatory deductions or adjustments as appropriate; and qualifying 
common equity tier 1 minority interests” (Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, n.d.).  
    
The FDIC also refers to common equity tier 1 capital as “the most loss- 
absorbing form of capital,” thereby explaining why this kind of capital has 
been such a central focus in Basel III (Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, n.d.) 
o Additional Tier 1 Capital: The FDIC also lists the components for 
additional tier 1 capital, which “includes qualifying noncumulative 
perpetual preferred stock, bank-issued Small Business Lending Fund and 
Troubled Asset Relief Program instruments that previously qualified for 
tier 1 capital, and qualifying tier 1 minority interests” (Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, n.d.).  
• Tier 2 Capital: The components of tier 2 capital, as listed by the FDIC, are “the 
allowance for loan and lease losses up to 1.25 percent of risk-weighted assets, 
qualifying preferred stock, subordinated debt, and qualifying tier 2 minority 
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interests, less any deductions in the tier 2 instruments of an unconsolidated 
financial institution” (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, n.d.).  
Few changes were made between Basel I and Basel II, but after the financial 
crisis, regulators saw Basel III as a chance to change the financial system. Table 1 
highlights the key changes made between Basel I, Basel II, and Basel III in regards to the 
capital requirements.  
Table 1: Basel III Capital Requirements Compared with Basel I and Basel II 
Capital Requirements 
 Basel I Basel II Basel III 
Quantity of Capital 
Minimum Total Capital 8.0 8.0 8.0 
Capital Conservation Buffer 2/ n/a 3/ n/a 2.5 
Minimum Total Capital Plus Conservation Buffer n/a n/a n/a 
Countercyclical Buffer 2/ n/a n/a 0-2.5 
Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIB) 
Surcharge 2/ 
n/a n/a 1-2.5 
Minimum Total Capital Plus Conservation Buffer, 
Countercyclical Buffer, and G-SIB Charge 
8.0 8.0 11.5-
15.5 
Leverage Ratio 4/ n/a n/a 3.0 
 Quality of Capital  
Minimum Common Equity Capital 5/ n/a n/a 4.5 
Minimum Tier 1 Capital 4.0 4.0 6.0 
Hybrid Capital Instruments with Incentive to 
Redeem 6/ 
Eligible Eligible Not 
eligible 
Source: (Dagher, Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, Ratnovski, & Tong, 2016) 
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Basel II made no changes to the respective minimums of quantity and quality of 
capital required in Basel I. However, with the newest installment of Basel III, a capital 
conservation buffer of 2.5% was added to the 8% minimum capital requirement of the 
earlier two installments, bringing the minimum total capital required to 10.5%. The 
capital conservation buffer “is designed to strengthen an institution’s financial resilience 
during economic cycles” (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, n.d.). The 
countercyclical buffer acts similarly, aiming “to use a buffer of capital to achieve the 
broader macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector from periods of excess 
aggregate credit growth that have often been associated with the build-up of system-wide 
risk” (“Countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB),” 2015). A countercyclical buffer of 
between 0 and 2.5% was also imposed in Basel III and added to the total minimum 
capital requirements for banks. Global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) are also 
subject to more capital requirements, in addition to the capital conservation buffer and 
countercyclical buffer, under the Basel III regulation. The G-SIBs identified were placed 
into one of four buckets, with the lowest bucket adding an additional 1% to the minimum 
total capital requirement and the highest bucket adding up to 2.5% to the minimum total 
capital requirement. To see the list of G-SIBs sorted according to their additional capital 
requirements, refer to Table 2 in the research methodology. In total, Basel III has raised 
the minimum total capital requirements for all of the G-SIBs in the United States to 
between 11.5% and 15.5%, up from the 8% minimum in Basel II.  
Not only did Basel III call for changes in regards to the quantity of capital, but the 
regulation also made changes in regards to the quality of capital. Basel III requires that all 
banks now hold a minimum of 6% in Tier 1 Capital as opposed to the earlier 4%. In 
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addition, Basel III added a new requirement that common equity capital must be at least 
4.5% of risk-weighted assets. The risk-weighting of assets was developed in Basel I, and, 
as stated earlier, some scholars, such as Martin Wolf, have called into question the 
effectiveness of this procedure.  
 
Advocates for Capital Requirements 
In this section, I will provide the theories of scholars who believe that capital 
requirements are an important part of regulating the financial system. An ideal starting 
point for the discussion on capital requirements is with one of the most important works 
in capital structure theory, the Modigliani-Miller theorem. In a perfect world, with perfect 
markets, and rational actors, Modigliani and Miller concluded that “no such optimal 
structure exists-all structures being equivalent from the point of view of the cost of 
capital” (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Modigliani and Miller therefore dispel the idea of 
an optimal capital structure, stating instead that there is little difference in the financing 
decisions of a firm, that is, whether they choose to finance themselves with debt or with 
equity. According to the theorem, neither leveraged firms or unleveraged firms are more 
or less optimal than the other, assuming perfect markets. The Modigliani-Miller theorem 
also posits that the capital structure of a firm does not actually impact the risk of the 
firm’s return on assets (ROA) or the overall funding costs (Gersbach Haller, & Müller, 
2015). Rather, the theorem suggests that the risk is merely redistributed among those who 
are providing funding to the firm (Gersbach Haller, & Müller, 2015). Even if Modigliani 
and Miller’s work on the irrelevance of capital structure does not always pertain to real 
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markets, which are imperfect, it provides a strong theoretical foundation that has been 
built upon by countless more scholars. 
Since the actors in the financial markets do not always act rationally, financial 
crises are a reality, and the Basel III capital requirements aim to lessen the severity of 
these crises by increasing the stability of both individual financial institutions as well as 
the overall financial system. The financial crisis of 2008 showed that in such a global, 
interconnected world, crises can easily extend to other countries or regions through a 
spillover effect. In this way, bank default risk may have become systemic, meaning that if 
a bank defaults, that is, if a bank is unable to pay off its debts, this default will also 
impact other financial and non-financial institutions (Fiordelisi & Marqués-Ibañez, 
2013). A study by Fiordelisi and Marqués-Ibañez found that securitization among banks 
also increases the risk of failure across several banks, or even a whole industry (Fiordelisi 
& Marqués-Ibañez, 2013). The default risk of individual banks therefore increases 
systematic risk, which supports such regulations as Basel III, which place a heightened 
focus on global systemically important financial institutions.  
 The theoretical background on capital structure therefore suggests that capital 
requirements are needed in order to regulate the financial services industry. The question, 
therefore, that many scholars, regulators, and bankers, are still plagued with, is whether 
there is an optimal capital structure for banks to have. At the time of the financial crisis, 
Basel II only required that banks hold a minimum capital ratio of 8%. In a study called 
“Benefits and Costs of Bank Capital,” the International Monetary Fund (Dagher, 
Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, Ratnovski, & Tong, 2016) came to the conclusion that “a capital 
ratio of 15 percent in 2007 would have avoided the need for capital injection in almost 55 
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percent of cases in the United States and 75 percent of cases in Europe” (Dagher, 
Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, Ratnovski, & Tong, 2016). In addition, the IMF found that 
injection could have been avoided in almost all cases with a capital ratio of 23 percent 
(Dagher, Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, Ratnovski, & Tong, 2016). Given these findings by the 
IMF, the new Basel III capital requirements, which require banks to hold a minimum 
capital ratio of between 11.5% and 15.5%, seem to have successfully bolstered the 
financial system against suffering another crisis of the same magnitude as the 2008 
financial crisis.  
Many scholars still seem to believe that the Basel III requirements could be 
higher. Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig are two of these such scholars who make a case 
for higher bank equity in their book The Bankers' New Clothes: What's Wrong with 
Banking and What to Do About It. Admati and Hellwig call on the work of Modigliani 
and Miller, remembering their conclusion that the change in funding mix did not 
increase/decrease the amount of risk present, but rather distributed differently the risk 
from one party to another (Admati and Hellwig, 2014). Admati and Hellwig also call into 
question the risk-weighting of assets, which is central to the Basel III capital 
requirements. The two scholars state that the process of risk-weighting is neither 
scientifically sound nor ensures that an institution is better equipped to deal with a 
financial crisis (Admati and Hellwig, 2014). Instead, the scholars state: 
“Empirical research on the financial crisis has actually shown that a high ratio of 
equity relative to risk-weighted assets did not mean that a bank was safe. By 
contrast, a high ratio of equity relative to total assets, without risk weights, meant 




These findings would suggest that not only did the BCBS need to change the minimum 
capital requirements when they published the Basel III regulation, but they may have 
needed to change the process through which they determined the capital requirements. 
Admati and Hellwig are not the only scholars who have found fault with these current 
capital ratios. In his book, Martin Wolf cites the rise of Eugene Fama’s efficient market 
hypothesis as an example of evidence of market liberalization (Wolf, 2014). However, 
even Fama, the Nobel Prize winning economist, admits that capital requirements may not 
be high enough still to curb the existence of “too big to fail” banks. In an interview with 
the American Enterprise Institute, Eugene Fama states that “One way to take that off the 
table is to increase the equity requirements. Not like they’ve been talking about them, 
though. They have to go up to maybe 20, 25% equity financing of these too-big-to-fail 
banks” (Pethokoukis, 2014). Fama continues in this interview to reference the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem, discussed earlier, stating: 
“Miller got the Nobel Prize for the Modigliani-Miller theorem, which basically 
says the way you finance yourself is irrelevant. And the banks will scream and 
say, ‘We need all this debt-financing because otherwise it will be idle money.’ 
Well, look at mutual funds, they’re 100% equity-financed. No problem there” 
(Pethokoukis, 2014).  
 
The fear of idle money, which Fama references above, stems from the theories of critics 
who believe that higher capital requirements have a negative impact on bank lending, and 
therefore, economic growth. Fama addressed these concerns in the interview, stating that, 
“First you have to calculate whether it would hurt economic growth more than a 
continuation of America’s serial financial crises” (Pethokoukis, 2014). To conclude, 
while many critics and banks bemoan the “cost” of capital, scholars like Fama, Admati, 
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and Hellwig will respond that the cost of capital requirements is negligible if you count 
the cost that the overall economy pays in the case of financial crises. 
Scholars like Admati, Hellwig, Fama, Miller, and Modigliani are in agreement 
with regulators that capital requirements, like those suggested in Basel III, are needed to 
protect banks from default and to protect the overall financial system from future crises. 
In addition, some of these scholars, such as Fama, believe that the current requirements 
may not even be enough to protect these banks as much as we might need. The higher 
capital requirements that are currently in place from Basel III, while they have made the 
system more stable, may not have made them stable enough to completely dispel the 
reality of “too big to fail” financial institutions. In the next section, I will discuss the 
theories of those who have criticized these capital requirements and believe that even at 
their current levels, our capital requirements may be too high.  
 
Critics of the Basel III Requirements 
           It may seem intuitive that these higher capital requirements proposed by Basel III 
are a needed measure to further protect the banking system against “too big to fail” 
financial institutions. However, many people disagree with the opinions of the scholars 
cited in the section above. This section will provide some of the opinions of the 
politicians, bankers, and scholars who have criticized the Basel III capital requirements 
and its potential costs. Different opinions and theories exist on why financial crises occur 
in the first place, whether the fault lies with regulators or with the banks, or whether these 
crises are inevitable in a fragile financial system, as Minsky believed. Many people 
therefore believe that the government can do more harm than good when they over-
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regulate. In a 2018 speech, Randal Quarles, the Vice Chair for Supervision of the Federal 
Reserve’s Board of Governors, stated that he counted 24 requirements in the Basel III 
framework (Quarles, 2018). In this speech, Quarles states “While I do not know precisely 
the socially optimal number of loss absorbency requirements for large banking firms, I 
am reasonably certain that 24 is too many” (Quarles, 2018). In this statement, Quarles 
speaks in agreement with many who believe that while regulations are essential in the 
financial sector, the amount of regulation since the 2008 financial crisis has gone beyond 
what is necessary. 
While scholars seem to be mostly in agreement about the need for higher capital 
requirements after the 2008 crisis, some of the greatest pushback has come from the 
executives of major banks. In an interview with Barron’s, the Morgan Stanley CEO, 
James Gorman, acknowledged that overall, the regulation that came out of the 2008 
financial crisis has benefitted the financial system and, as a whole, has made it safer. 
However, Gorman offered few adjustments that he would prefer to the regulation. One of 
these adjustments Gorman touched upon was the issue of capital requirements, stating 
that he believes banks may be required to hold too much liquid capital, which he stated 
“dampens the ability of banks to generate returns” and “potentially dampens their impact 
on economic growth” (Strauss, 2017). Admati and Hellwig also acknowledged the 
resistance of some major bank executives to the regulation of their industry, pointing to 
the harmful language that CEO’s use to suggest that banks are not fragile institutions 
(Admati and Hellwig, 2014). In J.P. Morgan’s April 2018 Letter to Shareholders, CEO 
Jamie Dimon lists “transparency, financial discipline, and a fortress balance sheet” as a 
few of J.P. Morgan’s business strategies (Dimon, 2017). Referring to a “fortress balance 
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sheet” suggests that the bank has the strength to protect itself in the case of a financial 
crisis, and that its assets are sufficient to provide liquidity if needed.  
In addition, the IMF listed some of the potential unintended costs of these capital 
requirements, as noted by their earlier cited report, “Benefits and Costs of Bank Capital.” 
In this report, the IMF found that “tighter requirements on banks may provide stronger 
incentives for regulatory arbitrage” (Dagher, Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, Ratnovski, & Tong, 
2016). The risk of regulatory arbitrage means that as a result of the tighter requirements 
imposed by the Basel III regulation, banks might engage in even more “risky” activities 
in order to make up for a potential loss in profit. This regulatory arbitrage could also be a 
potential cost of the higher capital requirements imposed by Basel III.  
When politicians or bankers criticize these regulations, one must ask why it is 
they disagree with this measure of safety. Reflecting on the fate of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac after the 2008 financial crisis, financial institutions who lobby for certain 
regulations may find themselves worse off as a result of these actions (Wallison & 
Calomiris, 2008). Even after the 2008 financial crisis, however, some scholars still make 
the case that the government should not regulate the financial industry to the extent that it 
does. The primary concerns of the above critics are that these regulations may be 
negatively impacting bank profitability and lending behavior, which is the claim that I 
will attempt to address in the remainder of this paper. 
 
Conclusion 
The above literature suggests that many parties have come to the overall 
consensus that the Basel III capital requirements effectively lower the risk of bank 
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failure, therefore lowering the overall risk of the market. If banks are less likely to fail, 
the government is therefore less likely to need to fulfill the role of lender of last resort. 
While these actors and decision-makers agree that capital requirements are needed to 
control the risk levels within our banks, there is greater disagreement over the level at 
which these capital requirements should be set. In addition, there are still many critics 
who believe that these capital requirements may be negatively impacting the functioning 
of our banks. In my research, I hope to contribute to the conversation surrounding the 
Basel III capital requirements by either confirming or refuting the theory that these 




III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In this section of my paper, I will explain the methodology that I used to address 
my research questions and to conduct my research. First, I will formulate my hypotheses 
in response to the two research questions posed earlier in this paper. I will then describe 
the sample that I have chosen for my analyses, and I will provide my reasoning for why I 
have chosen this sample. Next, I will explain the research design of this paper and define 
the three metrics that I chose for my regression analysis. Finally, I will discuss the 




In response to the two parts of my research question, I have formulated two 
hypotheses that I intend to prove or disprove through my research.  
The first research question I will be addressing in this paper is: Are the eight 
global systemically important banks in the United States less profitable as a result of the 
Basel III capital requirements? In response to this first question, I have formulated the 
following hypothesis: 
• Hypothesis 1: The eight G-SIBs in the sample are not less profitable as a result of 
the Basel III capital requirements. 
The second research question I intend to address in this paper is as follows: Have the 
Basel III capital requirements negatively impacted the lending behaviors of the eight 
global systemically important banks in the United States? I have formulated the 
hypothesis below in response to my second research question: 
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• Hypothesis 2: Bank lending will have little, if any, change as a result of these 
capital requirements. 
I will further discuss my methods in testing these hypotheses in the research 
design section below. First, I will justify the data sample that I chose for this analysis. 
 
Sample Data 
The Basel III capital requirements are very important to the operations of large, 
systemically important financial institutions. I choose to focus on global systemically 
important banks, because these banks are those which would pose the most threat to the 
financial industry and to the economy in the event of another crisis. Global systemically 
important banks are those which are so large that their failure could cause the failure of 
the entire financial system. In other words, these are the banks that the government must 
bailout in the case of default during a financial crisis, making them “too big to fail.”  
I selected these global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) for my sample from 
a report published by the financial stability board (FSB) in conjunction with the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). In this report, the FSB determines a list of 
globally systemically important banks (G-SIBs) based upon 2017 year-end data. These 
twenty-nine G-SIBs have been placed into one of four buckets according to the additional 
capital buffer they are subject to under the Basel III capital requirements. Refer to Table 
2 below for the most recently published list of G-SIBs, as of November 2018. The eight 
bolded banks (JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, Wells 
Fargo, Bank of New York Melon, Morgan Stanley, and State Street) are those within the 
United States, which will be used in my sample.  
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Table 2: Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) 
Additional 
Capital Buffer 
G-SIBs (organized alphabetically by bucket) 
3.5% (Empty) 











Bank of America 




Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited 
Mitsubishi UFJ FG 
Wells Fargo 
1.0% Agricultural Bank of China 
Bank of New York Mellon 
China Construction Bank 
Credit Suisse 
Groupe BPCE 









Sumitomo Mitsui FG 
UBS 
Unicredit Group 
Source: (Financial Stability Board, 2018) 
 
Research Design 
 In order to determine the effect of the Basel III capital requirements on bank 
profitability and lending behaviors, I ran two regressions using data from the eight global 
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systemically important banks listed in Table 2. The first regression focused on the 
regulation’s potential impact on bank profitability, focusing on the total risk-based capital 
ratio of each bank and the return on asset (ROA) values of each bank on a yearly basis. 
The purpose of this regression was to ascertain whether these two values were correlated 
and whether the findings were significant. I ran a similar regression to determine the 
possible effect that the Basel III capital requirements may have had upon the lending 
behaviors of each of these eight banks. This second regression tested for a correlation 
between the loans-to-deposits ratio (LDR) of each of these eight G-SIBs and the total 
risk-based capital ratio of each bank. 
 Finally, I calculated the Pearson correlation coefficient for ROA and total risk-
based capital ratio and LDR and total risk-based capital ratio for each of these banks. A 
Pearson correlation is a number between -1 and 1 that reveals the nature of a relationship 
(positive or negative) and the strength of a relationship between two variables. A Pearson 
correlation coefficient with a value close to -1 or 1 reveals a stronger correlation between 
two variables, while a Pearson correlation with a value close to 0 reveals a low 
correlation between to variables. In my analysis, I display the values of the two Pearson 
correlations I calculated for each bank in one table for ease of comparison. 
 
Metrics 
 In order to run the regression analysis, I had to select three metrics: one 
representing bank capital ratios, another representing bank profitability, and the last one 
signifying bank lending behavior. The three metrics that I chose for each of the eight G-
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SIBs in my sample are: (1) total risk-based capital ratio, (2) return on assets, and (3) 
loans-to-deposits ratio.  
First, I will be using the total risk-based capital ratio, also known as the capital 
adequacy ratio, of each bank to represent the yearly value for each of the G-SIBs’ capital 
ratios. The equation used to calculate total risk-based capital ratio is as follows: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 − 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 2 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 Next, in order to measure the profitability of each bank, I will use return on assets 
(ROA). ROA is generally calculated after finding the total assets and net income values 
on the balance sheet in a firm’s 10k, an annual report public companies publish to 
provide information on their financial performance throughout the year. In order to 
calculate ROA, the following equation can be used:  




It may be helpful to keep in mind that an ROA close to a value of 1 is a good indicator 
that a bank is highly profitable.  
The final metric I will be using in my analysis is the loans-to-deposits ratio 
(LDR). This ratio can be used to measure the liquidity of a bank, by comparing the total 
loans made by the bank with the total deposits received by the bank in the same period. A 
LDR of 100% would mean that a bank lent out $1 for every dollar that was deposited in a 
given period. A LDR over 100% would indicate a bank was lending out more than it was 
receiving in deposits. The following equation is used to calculate a bank’s loans-to-
deposits ratio: 





Similarly to ROA, the components of this equation can also be found on a bank’s balance 
sheet.  
For consistency, I decided to use one source when gathering this data. Therefore, I 
used a Bloomberg terminal to obtain the values of these metrics on an annual basis for 
each of the eight G-SIBs that I identified in my sample. 
 
Limitations 
My analysis is limited in scope as well as in the availability of some of the data. 
First, I chose to limit my sample to the United States because of the differences that exist 
between the US banking system and other global banking systems, such as the European 
banking system. In addition, I selected the global systemically important banks within the 
United States because these are the banks that pose the greatest potential risk to the 
financial system in the event of a crisis. In terms of the time period from which I 
collected my data, I limited the study from January of 2007 to December of 2018. I chose 
this range in order to capture the peak of the financial crisis as well as the implementation 
of the post-crisis regulation. It is also important to note that the Basel III capital 
requirements did not have to be fully phased in until January 2019. However, since this 
study was conducted in early 2019, I did not use data from the current year.  
In addition to the limitations that I chose to narrow the scope of my research, 
some limitations in this study resulted from a lack of available data. I attempted to collect 
data from the three selected metrics for each of the eight G-SIBs on an annual basis 
between the years 2007 and 2018. For all of these banks, Bloomberg provided data for 
yearly ROA and LDR for all twelve years that I selected. However, Bloomberg did not 
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provide the data for the total risk-based capital ratio for certain years for three of these 
banks (Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley). I have been unable to determine 
the reason that this data is not reported on Bloomberg for these banks. In order to 
maintain the consistency of my analysis in the regressions for these banks, I analyzed the 
ROA and LDR with the total risk-based capital ratio of Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, and 
Morgan Stanley for fewer years than I did with the other five G-SIBs. Goldman Sachs 
provided the full data between the years 2009 and 2018, so I limited my analysis for this 
bank to a shorter time range. For Citigroup and Morgan Stanley, I analyzed an even 
shorter time period than with Goldman Sachs, focusing on the time period between the 
year 2013 and the year 2018. The difference in the availability of data for these eight 
banks must be kept at the front of mind throughout this analysis.  
 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, by running two regression analyses between bank ROA and total 
risk-based capital ratios and LDR and total risk-based capital ratios, I hope to either 
accept or reject my two hypotheses. If the regressions do not prove significant, then it 
may be difficult to draw conclusions one way or the other. However, in this case, I will 
turn to the Pearson correlation coefficient analysis between each of these banks, which 
aims to provide a consistent basis through which I can compare the strength in correlation 
between values at each of these banks and look for trends within this data. In the next 
section, I will report the findings from my research.  
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IV. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
In this section, I will explain my research analysis and reveal my findings. I will 
begin by addressing the first regression I ran in order to test my first hypothesis. I will 
then explain the results of the second regression I ran in order to test my second 
hypothesis. In addition, I will compare the Pearson correlation coefficient values that in 
found for each of the eight G-SIBs in my sample.  I will not discuss these findings or 
relate them back to the current literature until the following section. 
 
Hypothesis 1 Regression Results 
 The first hypothesis that I tested was: The eight G-SIBs in the sample are not less 
profitable as a result of the Basel III capital requirements. In order to test this hypothesis, 
I used Bloomberg to gather the yearly ROA values and total risk-based capital ratios for 
each of the eight G-SIBS in the United States (Refer to the Appendix to see this data). In 
Table 3, I provide a brief summary for the regression that I ran for each of the eight G-
SIBs in the United States: 
Table 3: ROA and Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio Regression Values for All Eight 
GSIBs 
Bank R2 B (SE) P Value 
95 % CI 
Lower 
Bound 
95 % CI 
Upper 
Bound 
JP Morgan Chase 0.015 0.033 (0.085) 0.706 -0.157 0.224 
Citigroup 0.460 0.191 (0.104) 0.139 -0.096 0.568 
Bank of America 0.043 -0.052 (0.077) 0.517 -0.224 0.120 
Goldman Sachs 0.015 0.0274 (0.079) 0.737 -0.154 0.209 
Wells Fargo 0.069 0.045 (0.052) 0.409 -0.071 0.161 
Bank of New York 
Mellon 0.075 -0.071 (0.078) 0.388 -0.246 0.104 
Morgan Stanley* 0.713 0.074 (0.023) 0.035 0.009 0.140 
State Street 0.002 -0.011 (0.069) 0.878 -0.164 0.143 
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* signifies p<0.05      
 
This table displays the results from the regressions run between ROA and total 
risk-based capital ratios for each of the eight G-SIBs in my sample. As shown above, 
significance in this study is measured by a p value less than 0.05, and only the findings 
for Morgan Stanley proved to be significant. However, as discussed earlier, Morgan 
Stanley is one of the banks in which Bloomberg did not provide the data for all years 
selected in this study. The regression for Morgan Stanley was therefore run on six years 
of data, as opposed to twelve, like most of the other banks. Table 3 shows an R2 value of 
0.713 for Morgan Stanley, meaning that about 71.3% of the variance in profit for Morgan 
Stanley over these years can be explained by the change in total risk-based capital ratios. 
It seems unlikely that the capital requirements could have affected only one of these 
banks so strongly. Since banking profit is impacted by far more variables besides bank 
capital ratios, it is likely that another variable that I did not control for in my regression 
may be affecting this finding. I will delve into these results more fully in the discussion 
section for my research findings.   
 
Hypothesis 2 Regression Results 
 The second hypothesis I tested was: Bank lending will have little, if any, change 
as a result of these capital requirements. In order to test this hypothesis, I ran a regression 




Table 4: LDR and Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio Regression Values for All Eight 
GSIBs 







JP Morgan Chase 0.008 -0.571 (1.984) 0.779 -4.994 3.851 
Citigroup 0.313 -0.537 (0.398) 0.249 -1.642 0.568 
Bank of America* 0.478 -5.859 (1.938) 0.013 -10.177 -1.541 
Goldman Sachs 0.083 -1.279 (1.499) 0.419 -4.736 2.179 
Wells Fargo* 0.919 -8.528 (0.800) 8.864E-07 -10.311 -6.745 
Bank of New York 
Mellon 0.143 -1.338 (1.034) 0.225 -3.641 0.966 
Morgan Stanley* 0.673 1.234 (0.430) 0.046 0.039 2.428 
State Street* 0.445 -0.735 (0.260) 0.018 -1.314 -0.156 
* signifies p<0.05      
      
The findings for Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Morgan Stanley, and State Street 
are all significant since these regressions all had p values below 0.05. Of these four 
banks, Wells Fargo’s capital ratios had by far the greatest impact on their loans-to-
deposits ratios, displayed by the R2 of 0.919. Morgan Stanley’s total risk-based capital 
ratios seemed to have had the second greatest impact on the company’s lending behavior, 
followed by Bank of America and finally, State Street. Table 4 also displays the beta 
values for each of the banks, and as seen above, all of the banks, even those that do not 
have significant results, have negative beta values, except for Morgan Stanley. The 
positive beta value for Morgan Stanley, displayed in Table 4, seems counterintuitive 
because one would expect the capital requirements to have a negative effect on the loans-
to-deposits ratio of the banks. Morgan Stanley’s positive beta value suggests that with 
every 1 point increase in total risk-based capital ratios, the loans-to-deposit ratio would 
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increase by a value of 1.234, signifying an increase in bank lending or a decrease in 
deposits received by the bank. This seemingly contradictory finding will be discussed in 
greater detail in the following section, which provides a discussion of these findings.  
 The other banks with significant findings, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and 
State Street, all have negative Beta values, which indicates a negative correlation between 
total risk-based capital ratios and loans-to-deposits ratio. This finding is in keeping with 
the theories of the critics of the Basel III regulation. Based on these beta values, the 
capital requirements appear to have had an overall slight impact on bank lending 
behavior, with a larger impact observed in the case of a select few banks. The exception 
to this overall small effect, is primarily observable in the case of Wells Fargo, a bank 
whose lending behavior seems to have been strongly impacted by the Basel III capital 
requirements. These findings will be discussed in more detail and will be placed within 
the context of the literature reviewed earlier in the discussion section of this paper.  
 
Pearson Correlation Results 
 As stated in my Research Methodology, a Pearson correlation coefficient can be 
used to discover a linear or nonlinear correlation between two variables. A Pearson 
correlation coefficient can be any number between -1 and 1, while a Pearson correlation 
coefficient of 0 indicates a completely nonlinear relationship between two variables. The 
signage of each Pearson correlation coefficient signifies either a negative correlation or a 
positive correlation between variables, and the closer this value is to 1 or -1, the more 
closely these two variables are correlated. The Pearson correlation coefficients that I 
calculated for each of these eight G-SIBs provide a basis for understanding how each of 
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these variables is correlated differently between banks. Refer to Table 5 to compare the 
Pearson correlation coefficient values between each of the eight G-SIBs in my sample. 
Table 5: Pearson Correlation Values for All Eight G-SIBs 
Bank ROA and Risk-Based Capital 
Ratio Pearson Correlation 
L2D and Risk-Based Capital 
Ratio Pearson Correlation 
JP Morgan 0.122 -0.091 







Wells Fargo 0.263 -0.959 






State Street -0.050 -0.667 
Average 0.187 -0.352 
 
In order to better show the strength of the correlations, I highlighted those 
correlations that I deemed “very strong” red, “strong” orange, and “moderately strong” 
yellow. Very strong correlations are those that are above a value of 0.80, and moderately 
strong correlations are those that are greater than 0.50. In addition, moderately strong 
correlations are above a value of 0.30, and any correlations below 0.30 were deemed 
weak. From Table 5, it is evident that ROA and total risk-based capital ratio are most 
closely correlated for Morgan Stanley, followed by Citigroup, and are least closely 
correlated in State Street, followed by JP Morgan Chase. Loans-to-deposits ratios and 
total risk-based capital ratios, on the other hand, are most closely correlated in Wells 
Fargo and Morgan Stanley and least closely correlated in JP Morgan Chase, followed by 
Goldman Sachs. It is important to notice, that Morgan Stanley is the only bank that has a 
positive value as its Pearson correlation coefficient between its loans-to-deposits ratio 
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and its total risk-based capital ratio, which also seems to run counter to the theoretical 
logic discussed earlier in this paper. 
Overall, more banks saw a stronger correlation between their LDR and their total 
risk-based capital ratio than with their ROA and total risk-based capital ratio. Wells 
Fargo exhibits by far the strongest relationship between lending behavior, represented by 
the variable LDR, and the Basel III capital requirements, represented by the total risk-
based capital ratio. Wells Fargo’s Pearson correlation coefficient value of -0.959 means 
that there was a negative relationship between the total risk-based capital ratio and the 
loans-to-deposits ratio, that is, with every increase in the total risk-based capital ratio 
value, there is an almost equal decrease in the loans-to-deposits ratio at Wells Fargo 
between the years 2007 and 2018. In the next section, I will discuss in-depth, why I 





V. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
I will use this section to explain in more detail the findings that I introduced in the 
above section on my research findings. In this section, I will discuss the most significant 
findings of my research, relating them back to the greater context provided in the 
literature review. Based on my findings, I will provide recommendations that I believe 
would add clarity and/or stability in the financial system and in the regulatory sphere.  
 
Discussion of Findings on Bank Profitability 
Since none of the p values in my first regression were significant, with the 
exception of Morgan Stanley, it is difficult to either reject or accept my first hypothesis. 
At the bottom of Table 5 in the research findings section of this paper, I calculated the 
average Pearson correlation coefficient values for each of the eight G-SIBs. Although no 
conclusion could be reached from the regression that I ran between ROA and total risk-
based capital ratios since the p values were not significant (except in the case of Morgan 
Stanley), Table 5 shows that the average Pearson correlation coefficient for all of these 
banks is 0.187. Since this number is positive, it would suggest that the impact this 
regulation has had on bank profitability has actually been a positive one. It is important to 
note that this average is skewed strongly by Morgan Stanley, which has a Pearson 
correlation coefficient of 0.844, as shown in Table 5. However, even after removing the 
value for Morgan Stanley, which seems to be an outlier or otherwise influenced by other 
factors that I could not control for, the new Pearson correlation coefficient for the 
remaining seven G-SIBs is 0.093. This value is far lower, suggesting that there is very 
little correlation between bank profitability and capital ratios. In addition, the positive 
 36 
signage of the value signifies a positive relationship, meaning that if anything, banks with 
higher capital ratios may actually be more profitable as a result, as opposed to less 
profitable. This further weakens the claims that bank profitability would suffer if banks 
were subjected to higher capital requirements. This conclusion fits best with the newer 
literature released by Admati and Hellwig, who have argued that regulation can create a 
safer financial system without compromising on profit or bank function in their book The 
Bankers’ New Clothes.  
Since Morgan Stanley was the only bank in the first regression that had values 
deemed to be significant by its p value that was less than 0.05, I will analyze this bank 
more closely before moving on to the second hypothesis. Table 3 in the Research 
Findings section indicates that Morgan Stanley had an R2 value of 0.713. This value 
would mean that 71.3% of the variance in Morgan Stanley’s ROA could be explained by 
the change in its total risk-based capital ratios between 2013 and 2018. As stated earlier, 
this finding seems unlikely because bank profitability is affected by a number of factors 
to a greater extent than it would be affected by bank capital structure. Most importantly, 
the positive beta value of 0.074 n this regression, as seen in Table 3, means that Morgan 
Stanley’s ROA would have been increasing as its capital ratios increased. Figure 1, 
below, shows that Morgan Stanley’s ROA has been increasing over time. In addition, the 
bank has had capital ratios hovering above 20% since 2015, according to the data 
displayed in Appendix G. These findings therefore run counter to the logic of the critics 
of Basel III, since these findings suggest that Morgan Stanley’s high capital ratios could 
have actually increased the profitability of the bank. While it still seems unlikely that 
Morgan Stanley’s high capital ratios may have had such a positive impact on the bank’s 
 37 
profitability, I cannot determine the exact reasoning behind this finding, and I hope that a 
future scholar may be able to look into this in more detail. 
Figure 1: Morgan Stanley ROA between 2007 and 2018 
 
Data Received from Bloomberg  
 
Discussion of Findings on Bank Lending Behavior 
I tested my second hypothesis in the set of regressions displayed in Table 4, 
which used the metrics of LDR and total risk-based capital ratios to determine the effect 
that Basel III may have had on bank lending behavior. Table 4 shows that Wells Fargo, 
Morgan Stanley, Bank of America, and State Street all had significant findings since they 
had p values less than 0.05. The most significant finding of this analysis was that Wells 
Fargo’s lending behaviors seem to have been strongly impacted by the changes made in 
the Basel III capital requirements, which is signified by its R2 of 0.919. Morgan Stanley 
had an its R2 of 0.673, which is also very high in comparison to the other banks. Finally, 
Table 4 shows that Bank of America had the next highest R2 of 0.478, and State Street 
followed with an R2 of 0.445. The Pearson correlation coefficient values displayed in 
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Table 5 show similar strengths in correlation, with Citigroup also showing a strong 
correlation between LDR and total risk-based capital ratios, and Bank of New York 
Mellon exhibiting a moderately strong correlation. Table 5 also shows that the over all of 
the eight G-SIBs, the average Pearson correlation coefficient, where one variable is LDR 
and the other is total risk-based capital ratios, is -0.352. This value suggests that the Basel 
III capital requirements may have had a negative effect on the lending behavior of banks. 
Again, however, this value is skewed to the left by Wells Fargo and Bank of America, on 
which the regulation seems to have had the strongest impact. Still, it is important to 
notice that the only bank with a positive Pearson correlation coefficient value, when 
comparing LDR with total risk-based capital ratios, is Morgan Stanley, which had a value 
of 0.820. This runs counter to the impact that this regulation seems to have had on these 
other banks, and suggests that higher capital ratios has a positive effect on the lending 
behavior of Morgan Stanley alone. I urge future researchers to delve into what factor 
could have potentially created this finding, since I was unable to control for any outside 
variables in my analyses. 
 In addition, it is important to note that Wells Fargo’s loans-to-deposits ratios 
show that at the time of the crisis, the bank was loaning more than it was receiving in 







Figure 2: Wells Fargo Total Loans to Total Deposits Between 2007 and 2018 
 
Data Received from Bloomberg (Refer to Appendix E) 
In addition, Bank of America, which had the second strongest negative Pearson 
correlation coefficient value, was the only other bank according to my data (given in full 
Appendices A-H), with the exception of Citigroup in 2007, that was lending more than it 











Figure 3: Bank of America Total Loans to Total Deposits Between 2007 and 2018 
 
Data Received from Bloomberg (Refer to Appendix F) 
Given the rate at which Wells Fargo and Bank of America were lending during 
the 2008 financial crisis, it is not surprising that these banks were affected more heavily 
by the Basel III capital requirements. As stated in my research methodology, a loans-to-
deposits ratio over 100 means that a bank is lending out more than they are receiving in 
deposits. In the literature review, I discuss the possibility of bank runs in the most severe 
cases of financial crisis (Bordo, 1990). If either of these banks had experienced a bank 
run after the 2008 financial crisis, they would have likely been insolvent since they may 
not have had sufficient cash on hand to pay back the consumers who would have been 
making withdrawals. Given these risks, it may be a positive impact that the Basel III 
capital requirements has restored the loans-to-deposits ratios for both of these banks to 
less risky levels, thereby making the individual banks and the overall financial system 
safer.  
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Finally, I have been unable to determine the differences in the strength of 
correlation between each of these banks, although I believe it could potentially be 
explained by the different operations of each of these banks. For example, these 
differences may be explained by looking at the types of risk-weighted assets that each 
bank has on its balance sheet, or by the amount of lending that each of these banks has 
done historically. I urge future researches to look more closely into the differences in the 
lending behaviors between each of these eight G-SIBs. 
 
Recommendations 
Based upon these findings, I will provide a few recommendations that I believe 
may be needed to better regulate the financial sector and to change the way that we think 
and talk about regulation. First, I recommend that we better acknowledge the intertwined 
relationship between bankers, politicians, and regulators. Until this relationship is 
questioned, regulations cannot be accepted as totally unbiased, or uninfluenced pieces of 
legislation. Until society better understands the relationship between our banks and our 
government, regulation will ultimately not be done in a way that puts society’s interests 
before those of the banks that have the ability to influence the politicians who eventually 
elect the regulators. The current system of regulation is inherently flawed so long as the 
government strives for the approval of the banks in bank regulation, given that the 
government relies on the lobbying that banks can provide politically.  
My second recommendation, is that we shift the conversation from discussing 
only the “cost of capital” as opposed to also discussing the “cost of debt.” In The 
Bankers’ New Clothes, Admati and Hellwig wisely note, “When bankers complain that 
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banking regulation is expensive, they typically do not take into account the costs of their 
harming the rest of the financial system and the overall economy with the risks that they 
take” (Admati and Hellwig, 2014). If the overall cost of the financial crisis suffered by 
society was acknowledged as a potential effect of not having higher capital requirements, 
then these capital requirements would perhaps seem a smaller price to pay to avoid the 
massive costs imposed on society in the event of a crisis. To refer again to the IMF report 
discussed in the literature review, “Benefits and Costs of Bank Capital,” a bank capital 
ratio of 15% in 2007 would have meant that over half of the cases of capital injection in 
the United States could have been avoided (Dagher, Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, Ratnovski, & 
Tong, 2016). If one could calculate the total cost of the financial crisis that might have 
been avoided in the case of higher capital requirements, this could be counted as a 
potential benefit of higher capital ratios, which would likely outweigh any costs. In 
addition, one of the costs that critics attributed to the Basel III capital requirements was a 
negative impact on bank lending behavior. While these capital requirements did seem to 
have a negative impact on bank lending behaviors, as seen in the above sections, it also 
may have brought the loans-to-deposits ratios of banks such as Wells Fargo and Bank of 
America to safer levels.  
Although my main recommendations for this paper are qualitative, relating to the 
way we as a society fail to recognize the relationship between the government, regulators, 
and bankers and to the way we perceive the “cost” of capital, there are several ideas for 
future research in this sphere that are more quantitative in nature. I believe more research 
must be done to determine the socially optimal capital structure for financial institutions 
since we do not live in a perfect world with perfect markets, as the work of Modigliani 
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and Miller assumes. I also believe that it could prove interesting to look more in-depth 
into the lobbying behaviors of banks both in the United States and in Europe, in order to 
better understand how the close relationship between these institutions and major 





In this paper, I considered the following two research questions and formulated a 
respective hypothesis for each question:  
• Are the eight global systemically important banks in the United States less 
profitable as a result of the Basel III capital requirements? 
• Have the Basel III capital requirements negatively impacted the lending behaviors 
of the eight global systemically important banks in the United States?  
Though I could not reach a definitive conclusion on the first question, since my 
regressions did not prove significant in all cases but one, the Pearson correlation 
coefficient values that were calculated suggest a trend that shows very little correlation 
between capital requirements and bank profitability. The second set of regressions had 
more significant results and indicated that capital requirements had primarily negative 
effects on bank lending behaviors, with the exception of Morgan Stanley, which seemed 
to have a positive correlation between LDR and total risk-based capital ratios. However, 
as noted in my discussion, this may have proved beneficial for banks like Wells Fargo 
and Bank of America, which were lending at a higher rate than they were receiving 
deposits at the time of the 2008 financial crisis.  
Future Research 
In addition, I will discuss what future research could be done to build upon the 
research that I have completed in this paper as well as the research of the scholars I 
discussed in my literature review. My research does not conclude whether capital 
requirements for global systemically important banks should be higher, as postulated by 
Eugene Fama in my literature review (Pethokoukis, 2014). The capital requirements for 
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these eight global systemically important banks currently ranges between 15.1% (Bank of 
New York Mellon) and 21.8% for Morgan Stanley (as seen in Appendices A-H). In 
future research, it may be valuable to determine how profitability and bank lending 
behaviors might change if capital requirements are increased to 20-25%, as suggested by 
Fama (Pethokoukis, 2014). While I concluded that bank profitability was largely 
unaffected by the Basel III capital requirements, I cannot ascertain whether profitability 
would remain unaffected if capital requirements for banks increased to levels of 20-25%. 
In addition, I cannot determine whether substantially higher capital requirements would 
drastically impact lending in the banking industry, although it appears that in the case of 
Wells Fargo, Bank of America, State Street, and Morgan Stanley a strong correlation 
exists between higher capital requirements and bank lending behavior. My research can 
also be improved upon over time as more data becomes available after these capital 
requirements have experienced implementation for a longer period of time. The effect of 
these requirements may not be immediate and may change depending on the cycle of the 
economy. 
 Most importantly, perhaps, future research could attempt to determine the socially 
optimal level of capital requirements for global systemically important banks. Ideally, 
these capital requirements would not have a negative impact on the ability of a bank to 
profit or on bank lending behavior, but would still protect banks, and therefore, the 




APPENDIX A: Data Used in JP Morgan Chase Regressions 
JP Morgan Chase    
Date Return on Assets  
Total Loans to  
Total Deposits  
Total Risk-Based  
Capital Ratio  
12/31/2018 1.259626402 66.94613189 15.5 
12/31/2017 0.972858982 64.45350427 15.9 
12/31/2016 1.021461301 65.06534786 15.5 
12/31/2015 0.992604 65.42855245 16 
12/31/2014 0.871750105 55.54650157 15 
12/31/2013 0.749178505 57.34105213 14.3 
12/31/2012 0.920402523 61.47790746 15.3 
12/31/2011 0.865812519 64.1706109 15.4 
12/31/2010 0.837190337 74.47872833 15.5 
12/31/2009 0.557541512 67.50642339 14.8 
12/31/2008 0.299957267 73.80510999 14.8 
12/31/2007 1.054684698 70.11669601 12.6 
 
Data received from Bloomberg  
APPENDIX B: Data Used in Citigroup Regressions 
Citigroup    
Date Return on Assets  
Total Loans to  
Total Deposits  
Total Risk-Based  
Capital Ratio  
12/31/2018 0.959879229 71.02914615 16.64 
12/31/2017 -0.374077394 73.4946688 14.54 
12/31/2016 0.846482276 70.28747393 19.08 
12/31/2015 0.96502174 71.07712744 18.54 
12/31/2014 0.392740163 74.83932519 16.32 
12/31/2013 0.729444423 71.37924945 15.01 
12/31/2012 0.403419733 72.85441025  
12/31/2011 0.58435284 77.95252767  
12/31/2010 0.562358575 80.47724884  
12/31/2009 -0.084635094 71.26800545  
12/31/2008 -1.341945491 92.54764688  
12/31/2007 0.177661073 101.1040509 10.7 
 
Data received from Bloomberg 




APPENDIX C: Data Used in Bank of America Regressions 
Bank of America    
Date Return on Assets  
Total Loans to  
Total Deposits  
Total Risk-Based  
Capital Ratio  
12/31/2018 1.214347393 69.29269853 15.4 
12/31/2017 0.815877024 72.40522472 15.9 
12/31/2016 0.822739785 72.6246576 16.3 
12/31/2015 0.745430321 75.54221768 15.7 
12/31/2014 0.229770465 79.91761817 14.6 
12/31/2013 0.530164436 83.94705125 15.44 
12/31/2012 0.193038981 83.89258284 16.31 
12/31/2011 0.065817697 90.98980583 16.75 
12/31/2010 -0.099574185 96.54285799 15.77 
12/31/2009 0.310065647 95.19882293 14.66 
12/31/2008 0.22684509 109.0490681 13 
12/31/2007 0.943604485 108.8386777 11.02 
 
Data received from Bloomberg  
 
APPENDIX D: Data Used in Goldman Sachs Regressions 
Goldman Sachs    
Date 
Return on  
Assets  
Total Loans to  
Total Deposits  
Total Risk-Based  
Capital Ratio  
12/31/2018 1.131576157 47.55533366 17.5 
12/31/2017 0.482402061 47.83362218 16.8 
12/31/2016 0.859453054 37.64355041 17.8 
12/31/2015 0.708299493 38.91362923 19.1 
12/31/2014 0.959073895 42.64444169 16 
12/31/2013 0.869160061 41.73404929 19.9 
12/31/2012 0.802994983 35.2274743 20.1 
12/31/2011 0.484258598 30.93248149 16.9 
12/31/2010 0.949170413 34.59986982 19.1 
12/31/2009 1.544284388 30.89031436 18.2 
12/31/2008 0.23169687 33.18566073  
12/31/2007 1.184782203 45.52640958  
 
Data received from Bloomberg  





APPENDIX E: Data Used in Wells Fargo Regressions 
Wells Fargo    
Date 
Return on  
Assets  
Total Loans to  
Total Deposits  
Total Risk-Based  
Capital Ratio  
12/31/2018 1.163986236 75.43924987 16.6 
12/31/2017 1.142902187 73.12534291 17.46 
12/31/2016 1.180177134 76.10512075 16.08 
12/31/2015 1.317721057 76.54964555 15.77 
12/31/2014 1.436279241 75.56290711 15.53 
12/31/2013 1.485031241 77.76129402 15.43 
12/31/2012 1.380938201 84.44390154 14.63 
12/31/2011 1.233983736 89.05039834 14.76 
12/31/2010 0.988258732 95.56313993 15.01 
12/31/2009 0.961506451 100.4343352 13.26 
12/31/2008 0.281685508 114.0444995 11.83 
12/31/2007 1.523871849 126.9691691 10.68 
 
Data received from Bloomberg  
 
APPENDIX F: Data Used in Bank of New York Mellon Regressions 
Bank of New York Mellon    
Date 
Return on  
Assets  
Total Loans to  
Total Deposits  
Total Risk-Based  
Capital Ratio  
12/31/2018 1.161399396 23.68894957 15.1 
12/31/2017 1.159910213 25.18807148 15.1 
12/31/2016 0.975456824 29.10199106 13 
12/31/2015 0.810696678 22.78280462 12.5 
12/31/2014 0.675687236 22.24102848 12.5 
12/31/2013 0.573683106 19.78217663 17 
12/31/2012 0.712306505 18.9475609 16.4 
12/31/2011 0.878913585 20.0731193 17 
12/31/2010 1.096014434 26.0136646 16.3 
12/31/2009 -0.482060587 27.16697519 16 
12/31/2008 0.652161924 27.17679257 17.1 
12/31/2007 1.355438706 43.11619048 13.25 
 





APPENDIX G: Data Used in Morgan Stanley Regressions 
Morgan Stanley    
Date 
Return on  
Assets  
Total Loans to  
Total Deposits  
Total Risk-Based  
Capital Ratio  
12/31/2018 1.025999493 46.03284347 21.8 
12/31/2017 0.733313254 45.74407459 22.9 
12/31/2016 0.746249097 40.70201169 22 
12/31/2015 0.771188974 38.34442304 20.7 
12/31/2014 0.424302355 36.7712078 16.4 
12/31/2013 0.363397043 37.15492163 16.9 
12/31/2012 0.008883907 26.01090347  
12/31/2011 0.527736332 21.44579367  
12/31/2010 0.595633121 23.71418949  
12/31/2009 0.188215685 18.58227396  
12/31/2008 0.200326131 24.40372199 26.8 
12/31/2007 0.296224362 39.36504825  
 
Data received from Bloomberg 
Highlighted cells signify missing data 
 
APPENDIX H: Data Used in State Street Regressions 
State Street    
Date 
Return on  
Assets 
Total Loans to  
Total Deposits  
Total Risk-Based  
Capital Ratio  
12/31/2018 1.076076853 14.29862497 16 
12/31/2017 0.90496609 12.59843371 16.5 
12/31/2016 0.878543332 10.55603939 16 
12/31/2015 0.762603173 9.810204199 17.4 
12/31/2014 0.787383313 8.705989284 16.6 
12/31/2013 0.916988106 7.398994887 19.7 
12/31/2012 0.938078191 7.495995274 20.6 
12/31/2011 1.017671441 6.391500887 20.5 
12/31/2010 0.977230406 12.15821852 22 
12/31/2009 -1.134578092 12.00062179 19.1 
12/31/2008 1.145571742 8.136333259 21.6 
12/31/2007 1.009219835 16.49667498 12.7 
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